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PREFACE
In most states with market oriented economic systems privatisation plays an important
role in the political discussion, mainly due to the fundamental problem of all economic
systems, which is scarcity of available resources. The responsible politicians try to
improve the allocation of scarce resources and to increase the financial possibilities for
needed development investments by creating an adequate macroeconomic framework
and a business-friendly environment. Within the scope of these efforts the production of
goods and commercial services by state-owned enterprises only plays a very limited
role. The state would be best advised to leave these functions to the, in this regard, more
efficient private sector. The public sector should concentrate its respective efforts only
on the production of so-called Public Goods and, for political reasons, eventually on
some sub-sectors, which are essential for the security of the country.
Nearly all market economies and especially states which are in the transitional process
from more centrally administered to market oriented economic systems, have room for
manoeuvre towards privatisation of state-owned enterprises. Privatisation facilitate the
improvement of factor allocation and the reduction of budget constraints, not only by
the way of sales revenues but also by creating a broader tax-base, decreasing the need to
provide subsidies and, last but not least, mobilising private resources for the aimed
development-process. This is also true for the Republic of India as well as for the
Federal Republic of Germany.
However, privatisation causes not only advantages for the economic systems and the
public budgets, but also some economic and financial costs. These costs have to be
reduced as much as possible by an efficient target-oriented policy. Although the
corresponding policies and experiences in one country can hardly be a blueprint for
another country, a policy-dialogue at various levels about privatisation and on the
underlying legal and economic frameworks is helpful for all involved parties. The
exchange of experiences can also contribute to the avoidance of disappointments and
setbacks that could jeopardise the privatisation policy introduced.
Relating to the above the Government of India noticed: “Thus, while one would do well
to learn from the successful experience, one would have to be careful of the pitfalls as
well. In the final analysis, while experience of other countries is available by the way of
guidance, one would have to evolve one’s own techniques, best suited to the level ofII
development of the country. ... The historic, cultural and institutional context influences
the way in which and the pace at which privatisation is implemented” (Ministry of
Disinvestment 2003, p.1). Experience sharing between experts of different countries is
an appropriate way of learning from each other and avoiding the disadvantages of blue
prints at the same time.
On initiative of the Ministers of Finance of the Republic of India and the Federal
Republic of Germany, both governments agreed, therefore, to enhance the exchange of
experiences about disinvestment/privatisation in the framework of economic co-
operation. The Ministry of Disinvestment (since June 2004: Department of
Disinvestment in the Ministry of Finance) and the Bundesministerium fuer
wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, BMZ, (Federal Ministry for
Economic Cooperation and Development) are the responsible authorities. The German
contributions will be provided by the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Technische
Zusammenarbeit, GTZ, (German Agency for Technical Cooperation) on behalf of
BMZ.
This Report gives an overview of selected principles, elements and experiences of
privatisation in Germany, with special reference to the new Federal States in East
Germany and under consideration of selected aspects in neighbouring countries. The
intention is not to present a complete abstract, but to provide a discussion basis for
identifying starting points for a future dialogue about lessons learnt. This paper was
elaborated by the Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA) at the
instigation of Sanjeev S. Ahluwalia, IAS, (Department of Disinvestment) and Dr.
Dietrich Kebschull (GTZ). The author would like to express his sincere thanks to both
of them as well as to Gunnar Geyer, Carsten Hefeker, Britta Jens and to Rasul Shams
(all HWWA) for their valuable suggestions.
As this overview might be of interest also for other purposes, it was published, with
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1.  Background of Privatisation
Scarcity of financial, but also of human and natural resources is and always has been a
major problem for consumers, producers and politicians in all societies, developed and
less developed ones. The main challenge of all players in the development process is to
allocate available scarce resources in an efficient way, in order to reach an optimal
output. Without continued and successful efforts towards an improved allocation of
resources the economies of all societies cannot reach an appropriate gross domestic
product and a sufficient standard of living.
1.1  Theoretical Basis
In theory only two basic solutions for the steering process needed for an optimal
allocation of resources are conceivable. In reality mixtures between these two basic
solutions have been applied (cf. on this and the following Borrmann, Fasbender, et.al.
1990, pp. 15). For the following remarks it will be sufficient to concentrate on the two
basic solutions:
1.  Centralised decision making by organs of state: Experiences in all parts of the
world (not only in socialist or communist countries) have shown, that centrally
administered economic regulatory systems are not able to solve the problem of
scarcity in a proper way. Above all, these systems lack adequate instruments and
incentives as well as effective sanction mechanisms to induce rational economic
behaviour. The economic signals in this system are too weak to adhere to the
principle of minimising inputs and maximising outputs. Not seldom  production
firms even tend to the opposite. This is especially true for state-owned firms, which
are typical for this kind of economic system. But in strict regulatory economies this
is also partly true for privately owned companies. For the firms as well as for the
whole economy the above mentioned framework conditions results in any case in a
relatively low level of efficiency and dynamism, connected with insufficient
incentives to introduce new innovations for reaching higher outputs at lower costs
and/or a better quality. Poor economic results of centrally planned economies are the
main reason for turning away from this system in nearly all states of the world.
2.  The basic alternative is a decentralised economic system respectively a market-
economy system. In this system consumers and entrepreneurs plan their own2
consumption or production of goods and services on an individual basis, without
central control. This means that it is up to the  citizens to determine on basis of the
available resources what is consumed, what is produced, how it is produced and for
whom. The co-ordination of the different planes takes place by way of free price
formation and competition in markets. As the decision-making process of the
individual companies has to take place on the basis of their own limited resources,
the entrepreneurs try continuously to find a more efficient way for the optimal
utilisation of available scarce resources.
Market prices indicate the relative scarcity of goods and services. Changes in prices act
as a signal that production and the use of factors of production need to be adjusted to the
changed levels of scarcity. Rising prices – for instance -  signal growing scarcity and act
as a spur to increased production (signal function) and vice versa. Market prices also act
as a punitive mechanism (sanction function) for suppliers who are insufficiently
competitive. Such suppliers will be eliminated from the market if the going price is no
longer sufficient to cover their production costs. However, the prices also
simultaneously act as an incentive for entrepreneurs to increase productivity or to
produce alternative products to draw a sufficient or greater profit from their market
positions (incentive function). Therefore, price mechanism and competition determine a
constant pressure to raise the efficiency of factor inputs. This includes a steady pressure
towards an optimal utilisation of scarce resources. This means, the market economy has
an effective system to raise the efficiency of factor inputs, based on the available
(limited) resources (cf. Borrmann, Holthus 1992, p. 16).
Consequently the main players in market economy systems are private entrepreneurs
and consumers, not the state in his role as a producer of goods and services.
Nevertheless, the state has to play an important role as a moderator and facilitator of the
economic system. His main function is the provision of the needed  institutional and
physical infrastructure, especially the necessary legal framework for all players in the
market system. Above all an undistorted price mechanism, a functioning competition,
private property rights, individual control over property and the free choice of
occupation and business have to be provided. This includes correctives against market
failures (for example caused by monopolies) and, in the case of social market
economies (e.g. in Germany) or market economies with a human face (e.g. in India),
socially oriented safety measures.3
It is apparent, that in a market economy with a decentralised decision-making process
state-owned firms are an alien element. These firms, even profit-making ones, are
usually less efficient than private ones. Via subsidies, political motivated targets, etc.,
they often initiate furthermore distortions of price mechanism and competition, damage
the allocation of public resources and affect the mobilisation of private resources. Last
but not least in most cases it is cheaper to buy goods and services instead of producing
them by public companies. Therefore the state should not act as a producer of goods
and services. Exceptions should be the production of so called public goods, only
(education, health, infrastructure, etc.). However an increasing part of these products is
produced in many states, including Germany, more efficiently by private firms.
1.2  Selected Consequences
  In market oriented economies, in which state-owned firms still play a substantial
role in the production process (because of tradition, a broad definition of public
goods, etc.) privatisation should increase the efficiency of the economic system
as well as of the privatised companies. Last but not least privatisation should
provide additional public resources (by means of less subsidies, broader tax base
and/or sales earnings) and mobilise private resources for the development process.
  During the transition process from a centrally planned economic system towards a
market economy, in which the ownership structure is still embossed by public firms,
privatisation should result in addition in a new private and institutional
structure, replacing the existing system with its low efficiency pressure and
distorted price signals.
In both cases privatisation has to be connected with deregulation and
demonopolisation,  especially with regard to a functioning competition, the driving
force of a market economy. Not only public but also private monopolies distort market
prices and competitiveness. In case of natural monopolies or medium-term needed
monopolies (e.g. during restructuring-processes) an independent regulatory or
supervisory authority may be useful (e.g. in the case of German Telecom).
As a result of deregulation “Competition may not be increased overnight, but over a
longer term industrial restructuring and technological change may make markets more
contestable and so create a spur towards increased efficiency. The initial criticism that4
privatisation did nothing other than change ownership of property rights failed to
recognise the dynamic nature of privatisation, and instead analysed it in a very short-
term, static framework.“ (Bailey 1995, p. 306).
2.  Main Reasons for Privatisation
In Germany both of the main reasons for privatisation, stated above, were given:
Privatisation to change a centrally administered economic system into a decentralised
market system (in East Germany) and privatisation to improve the existing social
market economy system (in West Germany).
2.1 Challenges in East and West Germany
During the transition process of the centralised economic system in the former German
Democratic Republic ( GDR or East Germany) to the decentralised market system of
the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) about 8,500 state-owned enterprises
(SOE), which were separated, mainly for reasons of demonopolisation, into nearly
14,000 companies, had to be privatised within less than five years fom 1990 onwards. In
fact 12,162 companies have been sold for totally 33.23 billion Euro (see Chart 1),(from
these firms 855 enterprises have been sold to foreign investors). 265 enterprises have
been handed over to the communities. About 3,000 or nearly one quarter of firms have
been liquidated partially or totally, compared with around 40% in Poland. In the
framework of a so-called ‘small privatisation’ about 25,000 other small business-
undertakings (hotels, shops, pubs, restaurants, etc.) have been sold to private investors.
In addition, 4,300 firms have been given back to their former private owners. (cf. among
others Breuel 1994, pp. 14 and Vetter 1995). The responsible agency for privatisation
in East Germany was the Treuhandanstalt (usually called Treuhand or THA). This
public trust-agency was established (1990) only for the purposes to hold in trust and to
privatise all public undertakings in the former GDR. The Treuhand acted – relatively
independent, but supervised by the Federal Ministry of Finance – on the basis of a
special law and the unification treaty (Art. 25). The operations of THA ended in
December 1994 and were completed by a successor-agency (BvS).5
Chart 1: Privatisations and revenues of the Treuhand, 1991-1994
Source: Mohamed Alsayani, Privatisierung als Politik der Entstaatlichung und der
Systemtransformation, Frankfurt 1997, p. 94
Chart 2: Privatisations and revenues of the German Government, 1986-2002
(without Treuhand 1991-1994)
For detailed data see Annex 1.











































































Privatised Firms 4.852 4.360 2.083 867
Revenues (Mio €) 9.970 10.530 4.090 8.640
1991 1992 1993 19946
  But also in West Germany the Federal Government, the Federal Countries or States
(Bundeslaender) and the Communities have owned and still owns a lot of public
firms, in spite of ongoing privatisation since the 1960s and increasingly since the
mid of the 1980s (see Chart 2). This is because of the historical development as well
as the former broad definition of public goods. For example, the Federal
Government still holds a part of the shares in the telecommunication company
(31%), the postal services (50%) and the railway company (100%). The Federal
Countries hold, for instance, shares in energy supply companies, banks, airports,
universities and in a few cases they have even some shares at production firms (e.g.
Volkswagen). Many of the 16,000 Communities still have the ownership at local
transport undertakings, water supply companies, lodging-companies and other firms.
The Communities in the former GDR, even in the framework of privatisation, got
about 265 firms, as mentioned above. Totally the Communities still hold shares
(sometimes only a control stock) in nearly 100,000 small and medium scale
undertakings. In comparison, the Federal Government has investments in 120
companies (1982: in 958 and 1991 in 214 firms). In 37 of these 120 enterprises
(2002) the government has shares of at least 25% (cf. BMF 2002).
In the Federal Government and the Federal States the Ministries of Finance are
usually responsible for privatisation. Management consultant firms and/or banks do
most of the practical work on their behalf. Also the Communities choose their
operational consulting firms or experts on a case to case basis, according to the
requirements of privatisation.
2.2 Main Motives for Privatisation
Although privatisation in West Germany already began during the early 1960s, the
process is still ongoing, as the above mentioned figures underline. One of the reasons
for the  step-by-step approach is a ‘resistance-coalition’ between the trade unions of
public employees and a part of politicians in nearly all parties. Many civil servants fear
to lose some advantages from their public status and/or to lose their job. Some
politicians would like to save the “family silver“ for times of need and/or to keep direct
political influence. In the meantime the scarcity of public resources has forced the
politicians to rethink their opinion. Privatisation on all public levels is speeded up, also
in the other West European States. Budget constraints in the meantime have become7
one of the main motives for privatisation. Also in these cases the Competition and
Anti-Cartel Laws of Germany and the European Union have to be considered.
In all it can be stated that a lot of public enterprises have been privatised under different
business environments in Germany. Nearly all existing methods have been applied.
Also different elements of a social safety net have been adopted. This means, many
years of experiences with privatisation are available. Although socio-economic
experiences in one country should not and cannot be a blue-print for other states,
they should consider the experiences for their own decision making. This has been done
for instance by the East European States, which have supplemented the methods, used
in Germany by new elements, including so-called ‘give-away schemes’, mostly
‘voucher schemes’.
In the following some general lessons learnt and different methods of privatisation in
Germany, in selected cases also from neighbouring countries, are outlined. Special
emphasis is given to the elements of privatisation in East Germany after reunification,
because nearly all procedures were tested and/or adopted in this part of Germany. The
aim of this paper is not to give a complete abstract or to review the Treuhand policy as a
whole. The purpose is to provide an overview of elements employed as a basis for
discussion and/or more detailed analyses of specific subjects or procedures.
3.  Requirements and Procedures of Privatisation
Different methods can be used for privatisation. In principle they do not differ from the
methods which private entrepreneurs use to sell their firm to another private investor.
The selection of the most appropriate method depends on kind and size of the
undertaking, the situation on capital markets and, last but not least, on the expected
number of potential buyers. In any case, two general requirements should be
fulfilled: A transparent privatisation process and due diligence of company.
The due diligence or valuation of company is the needed basis for identifying the
potential sales-price. As a basic principle the value of the firm can be derived in two
ways. Either by considering the current (net) value of all assets or by calculating the
expected value of net inflows (discounted future cash-flow methods). A special form of8
the current value assessment is the break down or liquidation value method. In this case
the lowest limit for the sales-price will be calculated. In other words, if no offer will be
given above this price limit, it is financially more justified to liquidate the firm. In
reality auxiliary expedient methods often have to be used, because procedures of
bookkeeping, etc. in public sector do not provide the required information. This due
diligence can be carried out by management and internal experts of the seller or by
independent management consultants or firms. The second alternative usually provides
a better basis for price-negotiations. But in any case, the price is always the result of
negotiations, auctions or of the demand on the stock market (cf. among others Alsayani
1997, pp. 54).
The second general requirement is a transparent privatisation procedure, mainly for
two reasons. Firstly, to inform a high number of potential investors in order to achieve
reasonable sales revenues. Main precondition is to provide a chance to all potential
buyers to declare their interest. Therefore, at least “the details of any privatisation of
state property should be made public in advance (...). Within a fixed period of time, say
six weeks for large firms and three weeks for small firms, every one should be entitled
to make a counter-offer, ...”. This general rule has to be adopted according the special
situation, e.g. in case of selling shares, according the regulations of the stock market.
Secondly, to minimise “the danger of abuse, corruption and insider deals and the
ensuring political problems...”(Schmiedling 1991, p. 105). That means, the decision
making process, including the decision criteria, should be as transparent as possible:
formalised, standardised and anonymous.
3.1 Selected Methods of Privatisation
The utilisation of many different privatisation methods in Germany was mainly the
result of the ‘shock therapy privatisation’ in the eastern part of the country, which
required ‘creative utilisation’ of available privatisation instruments. In the following
some selected privatisation methods will be outlined (cf. among others Alsayani 1997,
pp. 88).
•  Sales of state-owned enterprises (SOE) on the stock market: Business
organisation, staff payment and legal aspects of SOE differ, as a rule, from those of
private companies. Therefore, changes of legal status of the enterprise and the
corporate culture are needed. The SOE has to be commercialised and to be prepared9
for the requirements of the stock market. The offer for the sale of shares will usually
be done by way of a bank or a consortium of banks. If the enterprise is a monopoly
two additional steps have to be taken beforehand: separation of the enterprise into
several units and measures to avoid misuse of the monopoly status of the non-
competitive parts (see ‘Demonopolisation’ in Chapter 4.1). The whole process is not
only time consuming but also causes relatively high transaction costs. Therefore this
method is only justified for large scale enterprises and concerns with positive
streams of present and/or expected income (positive market price). Furthermore,
a functional capital market is indispensable for stock market sales.
The advantage of this method is that high sales revenues can be achieved. If the
capital markets do not allow the sale of all shares at appropriate prices, the shares
may be sold in several tranches. The owner has the option to wait for selling the
remaining parts of shares in a more propitious situation on the stock market. This
also has the advantage that the public owner may keep for some time a strategic
control stock (25.1% of shares) or even the majority of shares, if wanted. In these
cases the stock market defines the price for remaining sales. This procedure has
been used, for instance, in the cases of Lufthansa (where the politicians wanted to
keep for some time a control stock) and of German Telecom (where the politicians
intended to maximise the outcome per share). In the case of Lufthansa it is
noteworthy that the Central Government reduced its proportion of shares not only
through sales but also by non-participating at capital increases of the company.
But improving the market mechanism and receiving high sales revenues were not
exclusive objectives of the government. The Central Government also intended to
introduce shares as a form of saving and capital accumulation to the general
public. For this purpose in the 1960s the shares of some companies (Volkswagen,
VEBA, etc.) were issued with a low par value and could be bought by people with a
limited income for a preferential price. These shares were called people’s shares
(Volksaktien). This procedure enabled some 4.5 million Germans to become
shareholder with a total amount of roughly 500 million Euro. Later on, this
complicated procedure (because of the necessity of reviewing the income situation
of purchasers) was changed. A kind of loyalty bonus system was introduced: All
private, non institutional buyers were allowed to buy a limited number of shares at a
preferential price, under the precondition that they keep the shares for a certain
period. As an example Deutsche Telekom may be highlighted. Its respective policy
made shares very popular in the population. Moreover, the employees of Telecom10
were entitled to buy employees shares (shares with a special discount – cf. also
Chapter 4.2).
The policy of distributing shares or vouchers free of charge (except for a few
bonus shares) was not introduced in Germany. (The same is true e.g. for  China,
Vietnam and Croatia). Main reason was the fact that by means of this procedure no
capital was provided, neither to the companies, which needed funds for urgent
restructuring measures, nor to the government, which needed the revenues for
development investments. In addition, an efficient control of management is nearly
impossible to achieve by inexperienced small shareholders only.
‘Give-away schemes’  were employed in several Central and East European
States,  mostly by using  vouchers, which the citizens could buy for an
administration fee or a symbolic price (see also Chapter 4.2). A widespread
participation in the privatisation of ‘people’s property’ should be achieved by these
voucher programmes. But the utilisation of voucher programmes differed strongly in
the post-communist countries. In Russia about 29% of shares in participating
enterprises were ‘offered for sale’ by the voucher method. In the Czech Republic
most large-scale companies (about 55% of their value) were ‘sold’ (1991-2002) by
this method (Musil 2003). Analyses of the Czech privatisation programme point out,
that the above mentioned disadvantages of voucher methods still have a negative
impact on the performance of the economy (cf. Katz, Owen 2002, p. 555). Apart
from that, the reasons for these programmes have been economically oriented only
to a limited extend.
“The reasons for bypassing the ordinary domestic currency (by vouchers) were
several: the lack of adequate capital in the hands of the public, the lack of a
functioning capital market, the believe that this populist programme would serve as
a successful midwife to the capitalist economy by actively encouraging the
population to participate in the new economic framework, and, not least the desire to
disenfranchise those who had acquired a disproportionate share of the outstanding
domestic currency by profiting from illegal activities under the prior regime” (Katz;
Owen 2002, p. 557).
•  Direct Bids for Sale:  An alternative method for changing the corporate form of a
SOE into a limited company is privatisation via direct requests for sales offers11
(Bietverfahren). This method was used in East Germany (but also in states like
Croatia and Hungary) for complex enterprises in the chemical, oil, iron and steel
industries. In other words, the method was used for enterprises with a small number
of potential strategic investors. The Treuhand offered directly, often on its own
initiative, to potential strategic investors a selected enterprise for sale. The decisions
about the sale and its conditions (among others concerning business plan,
investments and intended employment) were made in the frame of bilateral
negotiations (bargaining model). This procedure is faster and causes less
transaction costs than the change into a limited company. Another advantage is the
rather easy selection of appropriate strategic investors, needed for the restructuring
of companies. The main disadvantage is the lack of transparency, although formal
criteria were considered in the negotiations. But because of time pressure and the
limited number of potential strategic investors in some sub-sectors, Treuhand
accepted this disadvantage. It tried to minimise negative consequences, e.g.
accusations of corruption, by enhanced internal and external controls. Nevertheless,
not seldom this privatisation method was the basis for political conflicts.
•  A variant of this bargaining model is the freehand-sale-method:  In these cases
the Treuhand discussed individually with potential buyers of small and medium
scale enterprises without formalised procedures about business and restructuring
plans, planned employment, sales prices, management competence, etc. “The
Treuhand could choose freely whomever it considered the best investor for a
particular enterprise. When doing so, the sales price was considered as only one of
many criteria which where taken into account, and not necessarily the most
important criterion. It is evident that this sort of privatization is predisposed to lead
to low revenues and high expenses” (Boes 1997, p. 183). Therefore, the utilisation
of freehand-sale methods (also called free sale methods) was justified mainly by the
unique political situation of East Germany in the reunited Germany. Nevertheless,
this bargaining model was also basis for controversial political discussions. But it
should also be mentioned that preliminary (insufficient) results of respective
negotiations have not seldom been the reason for increasing the number of potential
investors, thus the bargaining power of THA, by additional calls for tenders.
•  Limited calls for tenders:  This method is based on a more formalised procedure
and was used especially for medium scale enterprises. The Treuhand identified a
small number of potential investors (short list) from the respective sub-sector, and12
asked them directly to provide bids for purchase, according to given information,
standards and other decision-making criteria. This bargaining method speeded up
the privatisation process without most of the disadvantages of informal sales
procedures. One exception may be highlighted: If the participating bidders collude,
(which is not implausible within a small number of bidders) the outcome of
bargaining will be inefficient ex post.
•  Public calls for tenders:  This method is the most formalised, standardised and
open proceeding. It is especially appropriate for the privatisation of small and
medium sized companies with similar conditions. The published calls for tenders
include proposed take-over agreements and all information needed for decision
making. As the potential buyers are allowed to provide a bid for purchase only once,
they are forced to declare their maximum willingness to pay. The sales price was the
most important decision criterion (adjusted auction model). This procedure was
used by Treuhand in the framework of the so-called small or minor privatisation of
about 25000 hotels, restaurants and other small firms. As this method enabled fast
decision-making, the above mentioned mass-privatisation was realised in East
Germany within a relatively short period (less than two years). The political
rationale of this method was to address the entire interested public, but especially
potential investors from the region (East Germany). Thus, a strong class of medium-
sized proprietors with managerial responsibility and knowledge should be created in
a region, where these management-qualities hardly existed, because of limited
individual property rights in the former GDR.
Public tenders or auctions are usually seen as one of the best means of
privatisation from the economist’s point of view, at least for small and medium
scale enterprises. “They provide the best allocation of assets and, in this way, the
best price. Normally they are less controversial than direct sales because the
procedure guarantees transparency and fairness” (Schmidt 1995, p. 155).
3.2 Management-Buy-Out (MBO) and related Stakeholder-Models
Per definition privatisation implies the change of ownership of an enterprise from the
public to the private sector. In the framework of the Management-Buy-Out-Method
(which has to be seen in connection with one of the above mentioned bargaining-
models), the ownership of SOE will be transferred to the existing (public)13
managers,  who intend to change their legal status into private managers and
owners by buying their ‘own firm’. Surprisingly the middle-management and not the
top-management purchased most of the MBO-companies in the eastern part of
Germany. (This method was also used in Central and Eastern Europe, e.g. in Poland and
Russia).
“The conditions for sales to the East German managers did not differ from those offered
to West German big business, as far as the price and securities demanded and the
managerial abilities of the buyers were concerned, though the Treuhand did agree to
postpone payment for parts of the sales (e.g. for the land and for certain heavy
machinery) for some years, up to the time when it was expected that the enterprise
would start to earn a profit” (Roesler 1994, pp. 510).
However  MBOs were also used as an alternative to liquidation, if no external
purchaser was available. In many of these cases THA subsidised the starting phase of
the privatised business by providing know-how, loan guarantees and/or by cancellation
of debts from the former SOE (in case of liquidation the state would have had to pay
these debts anyway). The respective measures should meet the main constraints of
MBOs: lack of financial resources and insufficient marketing know-how.
As large scale enterprises require huge capital-inputs, etc. (too high for the existing
management), this method focuses on small and medium scale firms only. According to
analysts only companies with a maximum of 200 employees should be privatised by
way of MBO. As a result, their average number of employees was about 70 in East
Germany (about 60% of MBO-firms had less than 50 and only 5% more than 250
employees) (cf. Dechant 1995, p. 341). A special sub-form of this method tries to meet
the lack of financial possibilities by leasing cost-intensive lands and/or machines
(Leveraged Lease-Buy-Out: LLBO). Other sub-forms, usually combined with MBO,
try to integrate employees (Employee-Buy-Out: EBO) or external managers from West
Germany (Management-Buy-In: MBI) into the privatisation process. Processes and
conditions of sales were more or less the same in all cases.
In the framework of the MBO-method, which was nearly unknown in Europe at the
beginning of the 1990s, 2,761 state-owned firms have been sold until the end of THA-
operations in December 1994. About 300 units of these were sold as a combination of
MBO and MBE and about another 300 ones within the sub-form MBI. Unfortunately,
all the sales are summarised in the under the headline ‘Management-Buy-Out’ in the
available statistics.14
This method of privatisation became popular not only in Eastern but also in Western
Europe. The main reason is the success of the MBO-enterprises in the eastern part of
Germany. Only 2% of MBOs were liquidated until the end of 1994, although hardly any
subsidies were paid and no credits granted until this date. “Unexpectedly, MBOs/MBIs
were a better privatization instrument than originally believed. The success
obviously results from the main advantage of using MBOs to take over firms: the
former managers of a firm typically have better information about the firm and its
prospects than any outside investor. To substantiate the success of Treuhand’s
MBO/MBI policy, consider the following. In nearly a quarter of the MBO/MBI firms,
profits are higher than expected and approximately every sixth firm started to increase
the number of employees that they have previously cut” (Boes 1997, p. 191). Based on
an empirical analysis about MBOs it was stated: “Management-Buy-Out should be
regarded as an effective method of privatisation.” This would apply also for the
industrial sector, where the optimal preconditions (low capital-intensive operations and
limited marketing know-how needed after the take over) are normally not fulfilled.
Therefore, this method is more appropriate for trade, service and to some extend,
construction firms (Dechant 1995, p. 346).
Key-factors of the success-story in Germany were the facts, that the MBO-method was
used only for small and medium scale enterprises and that Treuhand required also for
this method a business plan from the potential owners. In the business plan the
potential investors have to indicate not only their investment and employment planning
but also their efforts to overcome the weaknesses of this method, namely ‘no external
inputs for capital and marketing know-how’ and ‘low incentives to improve the
corporate governance of the company’. In Russia and some other countries of the
former Soviet Union also large scale enterprises were privatised via this method. In
these states the framework conditions in the 1990s are also widely regarded as collusive.
An efficient control of management was not given. As a result the positive impact of
privatisation on corporate governance was very limited and mismanagement was
increasing (not only in MBO-companies) (cf. among others Liebermann; Veimetra
1996). Admittedly it has to be considered, that the data base about large scale MBOs in
Russia is rather thin. The same is true for small and medium scale MBOs in East Europe
as well as in Germany, because the relatively small enterprises in these countries do not
have to publish annual reports.15
4.  Selected Lessons Learnt
From the ongoing privatisation processes in Germany and other European Countries
some economic and social oriented findings with regard to lessons learnt and further
analyses should be highlighted:
4.1 Economic Aspects
•  A business friendly environment is not only important for a functioning market
economy but also for a sufficient demand of potential private investors for buying
state owned enterprises (increased attractiveness of privatisation objects). In this
connection, a reliable legal and institutional framework is an indispensable
precondition, especially its components property rights and competition policy as
well as law.
The former GDR had the advantage that important elements of the business
environment, above all the legal ones, were transferred from West to East Germany
from one day to another. But there were also disadvantages, above all the politically
set unrealistic exchange rate between the West and East German currency (1 to 1,
instead of market rate 1 to 3) and the increase of salaries, which exceeded (again for
political reasons) by far the increase of labour productivity. Nevertheless the new
Federal States in East Germany had the “advantage of having a ‘big brother’ to
guide them and to support them while other post-communist societies had to adopt
the policies of ‘learning by doing’ or ‘help yourself’ ”(Gupta 1998, p. 38). In
Central and  Eastern  Europe the creation of a private business friendly
environment and the initiation of privatisation were more or less parallel processes.
Inevitable uncertainties for the decision making slowed down the privatisation
processes. Advantages in Eastern Europe were among others, that their enterprises
did not have to compete immediately on the world markets (gradual reduction of
external tariffs) and that the exchange rates for their currencies formed (in contrast
to East Germany) a more adequate basis to meet international competition.
This means, especially for countries in the transition process to market economies,
that privatisation cannot be seen as an isolated task. Privatisation and creation of
a business friendly environment (by deregulation, liberalisation, etc.) are two sides
of the same coin. In order to achieve higher efficiency, markets should be liberalised
for instance “by dissolving former statutory monopolies so as to allow freedom of16
Box: Lessons of OECD Experience
Privatisation policies are complex, in that they seek to meet multiple and at times
conflicting objectives. They also involve many participants, are often contentious
in that they change the status quo, affect vested interests and act as a catalyst for
change. Therefore, sound design of management and implementation processes are
needed to ensure that privatisation succeeds. In each country, the approach to
implementation has been shaped by domestic political considerations, the existing
legal tradition and policy objectives of the government. Despite great variation in
practice and the fact that there is no single right or wrong approach, this report has
sought to provide an overview of the issues that privatisation practitioners have had
to consider and found effective. The following are some of the key lessons learned
based on OECD experience.
1.  Ensure that privatisation has political support at the highest level
2.  Identify and articulate policy objectives up front
3.  Ensure transparency and integrity of the process
4.  Draw upon external advice and dedicate resources
5.  Address competition and regulatory issues prior to sale
6.  Ensure that an effective communication of the policy is in place to explaain the
policy, and to address stakeholder concerns
7.  Limit restrictions on foreign ownership
8.  Sequencing of sales can affect the programmes‘ success
9.  Staging of a sale should be driven by commercial considerations
10. Post-privatisation control devices should be used judiciously
Privatisation is often part of a broader programme of structural reform, and never
takes place in isolation. For this reason its succuss is critically linked to the
adequacy of complementary institutions (such as regulatory bodies, a competition
authority and the court system); legislation (for exemple, property rights, bakruptcy
and competition law); and complementary policies (these include policies such as
financial market reforms, labour market reforms, and trade liberalisation) that help
support the proper functioning of the privatised assets.
Source: OECD, Privatising State-owned Enterprises, Paris 2003, p. 1817
entry for competitors. Examples include deregulation of road passenger transport,
less strict licensing for operators of long distance coaches and local bus services,
and allowing other companies to start operations in telecommunications, electricity
generation and in supply of gas to households.“ (Bailey 1995, p. 307).
•  Linked with the legal framework for business, clear decisions have to be made
about the potential involvement of private foreign direct investments (FDI)
and/or joint ventures  in the privatisation-process. Foreign investors enhance the
domestic competition, provide additional capital and new technologies for the aimed
development, increase the domestic stock of know how, save employment, etc. In
East Germany, for instance, 855 enterprises  have been sold to foreign investors.
These investors provided proceeds of about 6.2 bill. DM (3.17 bill. Euro), made
investment commitments of totally 21,8 bill. DM (11.15 bill. Euro) and gave job
guarantees to more than 152,000 employees (cf. Dempsey 1994). Side-effects of
FDI (usually arranged by international investment-banks) have been in many cases
higher sales revenues than offered by domestic potential buyers (cf. FAZ,
03.04.1992).
If these and other effects of FDI are wanted, the national investment laws have to
give the same or at least similar rights and duties to domestic and foreign investors.
Potential foreign investors can be reached, for example, by Chambers of Commerce
and Investment Banks.
•  Privatisation policy and law have to comprise clear, credible and transparent
objectives. Because of the overall goal “improving the market system“ and the main
motive “reduction of budget constraints“, the objectives have to include – as a rule –
the realisation of high sales revenues, the avoidance of monopolies and a
relatively fast privatisation process.
The profit-making objective includes the possibility to sell shares of big companies
in two or three tranches  if the capital markets do not allow a sufficient demand at
reasonable prices. Examples are the privatisation of German Telecom or the German
Postal Authority. To document the seriousness of privatisation efforts and to give
the private sector already influence on management decisions, the first tranche18
should comprise one third or more of the total shares, at least more shares  than
needed for a control stock.
The objectives, mentioned above, include in particular cases also the liquidation of
firms. These cases are given, for instance, if no private investor intends to buy a
loss-making firm – even at a symbolic price - and subsidies for restructuring do not
guarantee a sustainable undertaking. This was true, for instance, for a part of the
enterprises in the former GDR. Accordingly the tasks of the Treuhand, responsible
for privatisation in East Germany, can be summarised (in the first phase) as follows:
‘Privatisation as much as possible, liquidation as much as necessary’. During
the second phase a third task was added for political reasons (saving jobs):
‘restructuring of firms with potentials on markets, if indispensable, to avoid
liquidation’ (see also below: Restructuring before or after Privatisation).
In addition to the economic main objectives in East Germany, as well as in West
Germany and other European countries, social oriented tasks were added. These
tasks as well as the restructuring and demonopolisation tasks will be described in the
following paragraphs. National targets for reasons of security or prestige are of
minor importance in Europe (in contrary to the past). They are achieved normally by
keeping a control stock on shares of selected enterprises (e.g. national air lines).
•  Privatisation authority:  In the creation of a clear and compatible privatisation
policy and law all main players should be involved to achieve, as far as possible, a
decision-basis by consensus. This would be helpful to keep privatisation to a large
extent out of ‘political battlefields’. But with regard to the implementation of
policy and law, experiences have shown that the concentration of power and
know-how needed for privatisation in a political subdivision in one ministry or
agency is helpful for the efficiency and speed of process.
The responsible authority should provide the needed information about policy and
state-owned enterprises for privatisation. It should select and supervise also the
management consultants or firms, which assess the privatisation objects as well as
business plans of potential buyers and facilitate the transfer of public property into
private property. “It is always better to have an independent institution responsible
for privatization. It can provide the necessary force, lead, speed and credibility to the
whole exercise. But every care should be taken to insulate it from political
interferences to be able to achieve the best economic dividends” (Gupta 1998, p.39).19
Another economist reviewed: “It must be clear which institution should be
responsible for privatization. This institution must be independent and free from
political governance” (Schmidt 1995, p. 155).
These remarks are based on the experiences in Germany and other European states.
The most consequent concentration of privatisation power and know-how was given
in the case of the Treuhandanstalt. But this extreme solution cannot be a blueprint
for other countries (cf. among others Meyer-Koester 1992 and Roesler 1994, p.514).
The situation in East Germany was unique. The task of THA was not only to
privatise many state–owned enterprises (SOE), but also to change the property
structure of an entire economy with a limited competitiveness at an extraordinary
speed and integrate it into the competition-intensive German and European markets.
This had to be done in a period where the traditional East German export markets in
the former communist countries were collapsing.
Therefore, the special requirements of German reunification called for special
solutions, also with regard to the privatisation by Treuhand. “By taking the
responsibility of assessing the companies, deciding about their viability and not
restructuring enterprises which it did not consider worth restructuring from the
macroeconomic point of view Treuhand saved a lot of funds to restructure viable
enterprises...This was only possible because the agency was a centralised,
monopolistic privatisation agency which combined ownership rights and the right to
dispose over the former SOEs. This enabled it to handle a huge number of complex
and socially painful decisions that a pluralistic parliamentary system could not have
made in a similar manner.” (Mueller 1996, p. 148).
In spite of the special situation in East Germany it may be helpful to analyse the
procedures and lessons learnt of Treuhandanstalt, not only with emphasis on
methods, instruments and other elements of privatisation and restructuring, but also
with regard to organisational and institutional elements of this agency.
•  Demonopolisation:  As mentioned above, in the former socialist countries and
centrally administered economies privatisation should not only reduce budget
constraints but should also result in a new private and institutional ownership
structure. Also in market economies privatisation plays an important role to solve
financial bottlenecks and to improve the decentralised market system. Although the
starting base is not exactly the same, in all countries the transfer of public20
monopolies into private monopoly power does not meet the tasks of the market
system. Monopolies or firms with a near monopoly-type market position do not
necessarily have to be large enterprises. Medium scale enterprises may also have a
regional or local monopoly position, e.g. companies for electricity or water supply.
There may even be a conflict between the simultaneous achievement of the targets
maximum revenues and increasing efficiency of the economy. Barley gave an
example of an insufficient conflict-solution during the first acts of privatisation of
monopolies in Britain: “...the Treasury believed that the sale of British Telecom as
a single company would raise more revenue than the sale of its individual parts. In
other words it put greater privatisation revenues before greater efficiency.
The benefits of higher privatisation receipts were immediately obvious. ... The
benefits of greater competition are less immediately obvious. More diffuse and of a
much longer time scale. ...Although telecommunications was partly liberalised, by
allowing a second company (Mercury) to start operations, the immediate impact was
extremely small in terms of market penetration.“ (Barley 1995, p. 310)
Not only the British Treasury but also other European governments have learned
from this and similar “tests“. In case of natural monopolies or medium term
monopolies (if the firms need some time for restructuring) the enterprises have to
be controlled in the framework of a Competition- and Anti-Cartel-Law by an
independent authority. Moreover, deregulation should be carried out consequently in
order to give other companies (not only one) a fair chance to compete.
In the normal case the process of transferring public monopolies into private firms
will comprise four steps (see also World Bank 1996, p. 57):
(1) Separation: Separating the competitive parts from the monopoly parts to
improve competition as much as possible. In East Germany the monopolies and
enterprises with an extreme vertical and/or horizontal concentration were
separated into different autonomous parts. All in all 8,500 enterprises were split
into approximately 14,000 ones, as mentioned in Chapter 2.1.
In West Germany the Deutsche Bundespost (postal authority) was separated into
three parts: Deutsche Post or German postal company (letters, parcels,
logistics); Deutsche Telekom (telecommunications); Postbank (bank services).
The Deutsche Post was given a medium term limited monopoly for some
services, which was annulled step by step. At the moment only for one service a21
monopoly position is left over (standard letters until 2007). The establishment of
German Telecom was combined with a far reaching liberalisation of the
telecommunications market. A temporary monopoly position (until 2003) was
given for local telephone calls (city calls). But Telecom has also a natural
monopoly for telephone lines. These lines Telecom has to lease also to
competitors by law. The case of Postbank was rather easy to handle, because the
bank had to compete with other banks from the beginning.
(2) Regulation: The second step is to establish laws and institutions to control and
regulate the business policy of natural monopolies, to avoid abnormally high
profits and to keep certain quality standards. This was for instance the case for
Deutsche Telekom. Laws and a Supervisory Authority have also to take care,
that Telecom is not using its market position to impede competition by renting
out telephone lines at excessive prices.
(3) Commercialisation: This third step involves the creation of enterprises, that
(although still state firms) are similar in structure and operation to private ones.
This means, among other things, that the enterprises have to be removed from
the control of ministries, assets have to be re-valued, the management has to
prepare the company for privatisation and is responsible to a board of directors.
This was the case in all three above mentioned SOE, namely Deutsche Post,
Deutsche Telekom and Postbank (cf. among others Schmidt 1996, pp. 45).
(4) Change of ownership: The fourth step is the core of privatisation. The
responsible public authority sells the enterprise or initially a part of it to private
investors, usually via stock markets (see Chapter 3.1).
The above mentioned time-consuming step by step approach is, of course, justified
for monopolies and large enterprises, only. “Small firms have proved much easier to
privatise than large ones. Most small firms were engaged in trade and services,
activities with simple technology and easy entry. None of the major obstacles to
privatising larger entities – high capital requirements, major restructuring needs, and
regulatory and government weaknesses – apply to small firms. Local authorities can
take charge of transferring small units, and because they are easier to value, many
parties can gain access to enough information for open auctions to succeed“ (World
Bank 1996, pp. 56).
•  Restructuring before or after Privatisation:  Most economists and politicians in
Germany take the view that the best way to increase the efficiency of a state-owned22
firm by operational and physical measures is to carry out the restructuring after
privatisation by the purchaser. The private investor should form a sustainable
undertaking according to his own plans and under his own responsibility. Civil
servants could meet the requirements of the potential private buyer only partly.
Consequently public investments for restructuring would be partly a waste of
capital.
Therefore, in the starting phase of privatisation in East Germany, the main task of
Treuhandanstalt was to transfer the state-owned firms into private property as fast as
possible. But, since the search for buyers took for a part of the firms several years
and the number of liquidated enterprises increased drastically, “the Treuhand was
forced to restructure many of its enterprises itself in order to make these companies
viable. ... At the commencement of its operations the Treuhand established
supervisory boards in each joint stock company and took an active part in choosing
the members, mainly amongst West German managers. The initial task of these
boards was to decide whether to retain or to replace existing managers. The
Treuhand also took over the task of assessing its state-owned companies as to their
viability and giving recommendations as to whether they should be restructured or
liquidated. ... So in spite of its original policy to give preference to restructuring by
private investors, the Treuhand was very active in restructuring enterprises while
simultaneously searching for suitable investors.“ (Mueller 1996, p. 136). The
preferences were given to “investor-neutral“ investments.
The above mentioned procedure required a great number of qualified managers from
the private sector. But because of the high demand for qualified managers,
experienced in the restructuring and reorganising of companies, there was a great
bottleneck, especially in the first half of the 1990s. Treuhand tried to solve this
problem by setting up five management holding companies in 1992/93. Each of
these so-called Management KGs, managed by experts from private sector, was
responsible for 9 to 18 companies. Thus, the limited and expensive restructuring
know-how could be made available to several enterprises at the same time.
Altogether about 90 companies with 20,000 to 30,000 employees were rehabilitated
by the Management KGs. In sum, 80 companies and four units have been sold to the
private sector. Commitments have been given for 7,110 jobs and for DM 695.6
million (355.7 mil. Euro) investments. According to some observers the
restructuring by Management KGs has been slow and costly, but an overall impact
analysis is not available yet. From the political point of view, Management KGs23
have been a success-story (cf. Boes, Kayser 1997, pp. 138 and Mueller 1996, pp.
145).
In West Germany a similar procedure has been chosen only for preparing large
enterprises for the stock market. In these cases experienced managers from the
private sector have been appointed, to restructure individual enterprises according
the needs of a limited company. As these managers had good chances to make their
future career in the privatised company, their motivation was usually very high.
Examples may be the privatisation of Deutsche Lufthansa, Deutsche Post or
Deutsche Bahn (German Railways). In the last case, the restructuring-process is still
ongoing.
Finally it may be stated, that restructuring by private investors after privatisation
is in the normal case the most efficient solution. The former Minister of Finance
Theo Waigel summarised as follows: “Experience teaches that privatisation is the
best form of restructuring. The private investor takes over all the risks and
opportunities when he buys a company. He will try, through investment,
modernisation and realisation of market opportunities to increase the earning power
of business and with it the job security” for his remaining employees (quoted from
Parkes 1992). But if the search for buyers takes a long time, the transferring of
enterprises into limited companies is a rather long process and/or if industrial
kernels in rural areas have to be saved a ‘wait and see policy’ is economically and
financially not justified. Restructuring by the public seller before privatisation
may be the logic  consequence. In East Germany main preconditions were a
credible scheme for the reconstruction of enterprise and its profitability in future .
In any case a proper strategy for the management is important for the
restructuring of companies. “If the managers are afraid that they will lose their job
in the near future anyhow, they have a particular strong incentive to use their
remaining time to enrich themselves at the expenses of the firm, ... If managers
consider it likely that they may make a future career in the private firm, they may do
their best to establish their credentials” (Schmiedling 1991, p.104). In the normal
case Treuhand tried to solve this conflict by choosing external managers from the
private sector (sometimes in combination with selected qualified managers from
existing staff), who received success-oriented incentives (mainly a percentage of
value added of the company).24
4.2 Social Safety Aspects
As many state-owned companies are overstaffed, privatisation often involves
suspension of a part of the employees. For social reasons, but also for political ones
(e.g. to achieve a relatively high acceptance of the privatisation policy in the population)
socially oriented flanking measures are needed. In the following, some of the
instruments used in Germany are highlighted. But first of all, two facts should be
highlighted:
(1) There is a conflict between social targets and the target of high sales
revenues. In other words, the costs for achieving social targets have to be paid
mainly by means of less revenues. In a review about privatisation in Lithuania
it is stated for instance: “The job preservation requirements place a heavy burden
on society, since these requirements result in the reduction of the entity’s price
and lower privatisation revenues. It does not solve the problem of
unemployment either. This problem is simply put off, since the investor is only
required to preserve a fraction of the total number of jobs for a limited period of
time...” (Bogdanovicius 2000). But it should also be considered that the
specification of too many objectives for one instrument, in this case
privatisation, has negative consequences for the achievement of all individual
objectives.
(2) The following remarks have to be seen against the background of the social
safety net in Germany. According to this safety system, all unemployed
persons will receive for a certain time (1–1.5 years) financial contributions from
an obligatory unemployment insurance, to which employers and employees have
to contribute during the time of employment. In addition, a so-called ‘social
plan’ has to be negotiated between the workers council and the management, if
a firm has to release a great part of its long-time employed staff for reasons of
restructuring. This is also true for restructuring in combination with
privatisation. Elements of this social plan may be a ‘golden handshake’ and/or
the possibility for older staff to go into early retirement, without or  with
limited financial disadvantages only. For example in 1994, the last year of
Treuhand operations, 650,000 East German employees went into ‘early
retirement’(cf. Hampe 1995, p. 568).
Decision criteria manpower planning:  A preventive creation of privatisation
processes may reduce the volume of cuts in manpower. This is one of the
reasons why Treuhand requested already from its second year of operation25
(1991) onwards a business plan from potential buyers, which should inform
not only about investment intentions, etc., but also about the manpower
planning. That way THA had the chance, to give investors, who intended to
adopt rather labour intensive technologies, a special treatment. If job creation
was an essential criteria for selection between various potential investors, the
buyer had to give a job guarantee. In case of non-achievement of the
employment-promise, the entrepreneur had to pay a penalty between 2,500 and
20,000 Euro for every missing workplace. Treuhand received job guarantees for
1.5 mil. employees (cf. Priewe 1994, pp. 26). On average, the provision of
working places was about 16% higher than assured (according to an empirical
THA-analysis for the years 1991-1993 – cf. Schmidt 1995, p. 152).
Saving jobs by Management-Buy-Outs (MBO):  MBOs, but also Employee
Buy-outs (EBO) and other mixed forms, belong to the standard instruments of
privatisation, as mentioned in Chapter 3.2.. These instruments are used normally
for small and medium scale enterprises (in East Germany the 2,761 MBOs had
70 employees on average) and contribute to the development of the middle-
class. But MBOs were used also as an alternative solution to liquidation, if
no potential buyer was available. In other words: To avoid unemployment,
the firms were sold at a relatively low price to the management, if a realistic
business plan had been worked out before. In some of these cases even “negative
sales prices” were accepted, for instance via cancellation of “old” debts of the
firm or by providing credit-collateral. With regard to job-saving MBOs can be
reviewed as a success story. They contributed to the 3.2 million jobs in small
and medium scale industries with about 7%. At the end of THA-operations
nearly 20% of the MBOs already had more employees than at the time of taking
over the public undertaking (cf. Lipinski 1992 and Priewe 1994, p. 22).
In  connection with job saving, the strategy “restructuring  firms before
privatisation” can also be reviewed (cf. Chapter 4.1). Treuhand saved by
Management KGs – for instance – between 25% and 35% of the employees of
the involved 90 companies. A review of these figures has to consider that for
most of these firms no purchaser was available before restructuring. In other
words, restructuring was an alternative to liquidation and the suspension of
all staff. The respective efforts contributed also to the preservation of26
industrial kernels in rural or other relatively remote areas and thus to the
creation of new jobs in other firms. Therefore, the indirect employment
impact was much higher than the mentioned direct one.
Short-time work and job creating measures:  During the restructuring phase
of firms (sometimes also of companies, which were still in the “waiting phase”
for privatisation) layoffs of employees were necessary. To avoid mass
dismissals, Treuhand introduced short-time work for a part of the labour-force
(in 1994 for 97000 East German labourers), often combined with vocational
retraining and off-the-job education (in 1994 for 240,000 employees). These
qualification measures, supported by the Central Government through subsidies
for the establishment of new small firms and by THA through facilitation of so-
called  work-promotion measures (ABM: Arbeitsplatzbeschaffungs-
massnahmen) by means of interest-free loans up to 10% of total costs, created a
lot of new jobs , according to estimations for more than one million workers (cf.
among others Breuel 1994, p. 18 and Hampe 1995, p. 568). This kind of labour
market policy, legally not part of THA-responsibilities, was based on an
agreement (1991) between Treuhand and German trade unions (DGB and DAG).
Another instrument was the promotion of work, employment and structural
development in special employment companies (Beschaeftigungs-
gesellschaften, ABS). These companies were formed on a temporary basis “to
employ workers mainly in social and environmental activities, with the aim of
making the process of the privatisation of THA companies socially bearable”
(Mueller 1996a, p. 396).
Last but not least, it should be mentioned that periods of short-time work are
widening the scope for employment-reduction by natural fluctuation, including
early retirements. These staff-fluctuations in East and West Germany in many
cases contributed significantly to the solution of over-employment. The
Deutsche Telekom had, for instance, in 1989 about 225,000 employees (50% of
which were civil servants) at its disposal. Within ten years the staff was reduced
by 60,000, mainly through natural fluctuation.
Preserving the rights of Civil Servants:  A substantial part of long-term
employed staff in state-owned companies are nearly irredeemable, according to27
their special legal rights as civil servants. These employees, especially the older
ones, are often not willing to lose their privileges (for instance regarding
pensions) by changing to a private employer. In these cases the public owner,
that means the Federal Government, a Federal Country or Community, tries to
employ them otherwise and/or offers early retirement to elder employees. In
several cases, the public owner “lent” the civil servants to the new private
owner. This means, the new employer has to pay for salaries and the usual extras
of the private sector. The former employer has to pay for the difference between
private and public extras, based on an agreement with labour unions. For
example, this has been done in the case of the German Railway and the German
Postal companies.
Influencing distribution effects of privatisation:  Privatisation does not only
have an influence on the property structure between public and private sectors,
but also on income distribution between employers and employees. To avoid or
reduce potential conflicts, the public owners introduced in case of privatisation
of stock corporations so-called people’s shares or preference shares. In other
words private buyers and/or employees are offered a certain number of shares at
a relatively low price. In  return the beneficiaries may not sell the shares for a
certain period (1-3 years, in the case of employee shares of German Post even 6
years). Side-effect of the respective actions was the introduction of shares as a
saving-form to people. As a successful example, the privatisation of German
Telecom may be highlighted (see also Chapter 3.1). Between 50% and 64% of
Telecom-staff bought preference shares of each of the three tranches (in the
years 1996, 1999 and 2000). In total, 35% of all shares are owned by private
purchasers, 34% by institutional buyers. (The government still holds a
proportion of 31% of shares).
Similar preferences were given in other countries, too. Poland, for example,
gave from about 500 state-owned enterprises, which were transformed into
limited companies in line with the Investment-Fund-Law (1993), up to 20% of
shares free of charge to employees. In other cases shares were ‘sold’ to the
population in exchange for an administration fee (20 ZL. for a certificate).
Although 95% of all Polish adults participated in this voucher programme, the
objective to accumulate capital in form of shares was achieved only partly.
About half of the buyers already sold their certificates during the first month for28
a benefit of up to 750% on the informal and formal markets. In other cases the
labour forces are allowed to buy up to 20% of shares with a price reduction of
50% (as long as the value of shares did not exceeded the average annual salary
in public sector, multiplied with the number of employees), (cf. Seyler 1995 and
NZZ, 26.11.1996). About the impact of this and related voucher methods (cf.
also Chapter 3.1) on income and capital distribution only few and controversial
empirical information are available.
5. Concluding Remarks
Worldwide experiences have shown that privatisation, if facilitated by an
appropriate legal and institutional framework, contributes significantly to
an increased efficiency and dynamism of the privatised companies. This is
underlined for instance by the surveys of Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), who
analysed some 500 firms all over the world. About one third of these firms were
state-owned ones. According to this analysis, privately owned companies on
average realise a better return on equity than SOE (8.5 versus 0.2%) and a higher
return on assets (2.7 vs.1%). In addition private companies have a higher labour
productivity (a lower share of employees per US$ sold - see Chart 3). Further-
more, privatisation is beneficial to potential investors, as Chart 4 shows. Other
studies analysing the impact of privatisation on the respective firms also produce
positive results. According to three other different studies the profitability (net
income per sales) improved in 63 to 71% and the efficiency (real sales per
employee) could be raised in 79 to 86% of all enterprises. Last but not least, also
the investment quota (capital expenditures per sales) increased in 55 to 67% of
privatised companies (see Chart 5).
In addition experiences in Germany have shown, that privatisation is a very
important element to increase efficiency of the former SOE and dynamism
of the economic system, to mobilise private resources for the development
process, to improve the allocation of public resources and, last but not least,
to reduce public debts and/or budget constraints.29
Chart 3: Comparison of efficiency of state-owned vs. privately-owned enterprises
  Note: Sample of 500 enterprises (world-wide) for the years 1975, 1985, and 1995.
   Source: see Annex 2.
Chart 4: Long-term return after privatisation
    Note: Measured for 102 (year 1), 97 (years 1 to 3), and 78 (years 1 to 5) firms.
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Note: Sample of 218, 170 respectively, 154 firms (world-wide).
Source: Box in Chart 5.
Under budget aspects privatisation may even have a positive impact if the sales
revenues are near to zero. This is the case, for example, if the new investor takes over
the debts of the former SOE, new subsidies are not longer needed (or only for a short
starting phase), and/or higher tax-income can be expected in future.
The above mentioned and other effects will contribute to a growing gross domestic
product and an increasing standard of living. The additional economic growth will also
create new working places which will contribute to compensate the layoffs in the
privatisation phase. But it has to be taken into account that the extend of the
privatisation-impact depends not only on the economic frame-conditions but also on the
pattern of expenditure of privatisation-revenues (more consumption or more growth
oriented expenditures?).
In general it can be stated that the main players public organs, entrepreneurs and
employees, will benefit in the medium and longer term from privatisation. In the
short run especially part of the employees will suffer disadvantages. To what extent the31
consumers will benefit, depends tangible on the degree of competition and
demonopolisation. The impact of individual privatised companies is difficult to
measure. But privatisation of public monopolies, combined with demonopolisation,
often has easyly observable benefits for the consumers. The privatisation of German
Telecom in connection with the liberalisation of telecommunication markets in
Germany led, for example, to a higher quality of services and price reductions for
normal telephone calls of more than 85% (see Chart 6). Significant price reductions can
be observed, among others, for the development on the markets for electricity and air
transportation after privatisation.




























during the day 30,7 9,7 7,7 4,6 3,2 2,0 2,2
after 6.00 PM 18,4 9,7 4,6 3,5 2,1 1,9 1,8
after 9.00 PM 12,3 7,2 3,6 2,0 1,7 1,9 1,8
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Source: Deutsche Telekom, Bonn 2003.
The German Finance Minister Hans Eichel summarised the impact of privatisation as
follows: Privatisation “strengthens the economy, provides incentives for Germany as a
financial centre and helps to improve the competitive position of enterprises and to
develop more efficient structures for performing government tasks. In this way
privatisation policy supports the protection and creation of new jobs, and promotes32
innovations and sustained growth.” (Eichel 2003, p. 6). A similar impact will be true for
India.
In addition to the normal transaction costs, privatisation may cause economic and
financial costs, too. As many state-owned companies are overstaffed, privatisation is
(as mentioned above) often combined with the suspension of a part of employees.
Flanking social measures, especially job-saving efforts, are usually rather expensive. In
East Germany the costs of supporting social measures have been very high (compared
with West Germany), because of political demands in the framework of reunification.
Also restructuring investments, if required before the privatisation of companies, caused
relatively high expenses. However, these measures contributed to the preservation of
industrial kernels in relatively underdeveloped areas and to the maintenance of social
peace.
Most of the supporting social measures are discussed and/or designed in co-operation
with the trade unions (e.g. the management holding companies and job creating
measures). Thus, they also contributed to the development ofa professional relationship
between trade unions and Treuhand.
It is the task of decision-makers to create an economically effective and efficient
privatisation policy under consideration of social aspects. A lot of experiences are
available in Germany, India and other states. Although lessons learnt in one state can
hardly be a blue print for actions in another state, experience sharing between countries
is helpful to avoid mistakes and disappointments, which could jeopardise the
privatisation policy. It is hoped that this Report contributes to initiate fruitful dialogues
on privatisation.33
6. Annexes





1986 0 3 509,5
1987 1 1 1247,8
1988 2 3 1190,2
1989 0 2 117,4
1990 1 0 9
1991 1 1 284,1
1992 1 0 0
1993 3 1 62,6
1994 3 1 571,5
1995 5 0 145,8
1996 1 2 1119,7
1997 6 1 2757,1
1998 7 2 10154,7
1999 1 4 2584,8
2000 2 2 1899,1
2001 2 4 3732,4
2002 1 0 262,2
Sum 37 27 26647,9
Note: Treuhand (1991-1994) and special assets of Federal Government not included.
Source: BMF, Bundesbeteiligungsbericht, Berlin, several volumes.
Annex 2:  Long-term return after privatisation
Years after privatization Return on acquired
assets 1 1 to 3 1 to 5
Average 0,199 1,264 0,882 Full
sample Median -0,01 0,377 0,195
Source:  Dewenter, Kathryn; Malatesta, Paul, „State-owned and privately owned firms: An empirical
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